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INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION IMPLICATIONS 
OF FUTURE SPACE PROJECTS 
John E. O'Brien 
General Counsel 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
As we are all acutely aware, the international insurance 
industry has suffered substantial losses in the casualty 
insurance arena in the past several years. Some of those 
losses, but certainly not all, have been attributable to 
certain space activities undertaken by members of the 
international community. In addition, many of the insurance 
problems also involve the extraordinary number of aircraft 
accidents and other casualty losses associated with product 
liability and related liability payouts which have occurred 
within a relatively short period of time. 
As a result, the allocation of risks between manufacturers of 
various technologies, the users and consumers of such 
technologies, and the insurers and re-insurers of such 
ventures, have resulted in a real or perceived imbalance of 
risk-taking to the apparent detriment of the insurers at this 
particular point in time. The reasons for this are, to be 
sure, complex. One thing is probably certain, however, and 
that is the global insurance community is exasperated at being 
the risk takers of last resort when it comes to what perhaps 
should by now be routine space activities. It is easy to be 
very sympathetic with this exasperation, but we must also keep 
in perspective that this is the nature of the insurance 
business. There are good times and bad. The pendulum of 
insurance underwriting history, which is never in complete 
equilibrium, appears to have swung in the direction of bad 
times for the space insurance industry. We all hope that the 
pendulum will swing back in favor of good times soon. 
Although we amateurs in the insurance world may be prone tci 
panic under current conditions, I venture to speculate that the 
professionals in the business know precisely the situation they 
face and, importantly, have innovative and productive _ideas on 
how to recover from the current unfavorable circumstances. It 
may take a little time, I don't profess to know how long, for 
these ideas to surface and take recognizable form. However, it 
is my belief that they will emerge in time and I think it would 
behoove us all to allow this to germinate. 
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As we attempt to chart a course for the future we should resist 
the temptation to allow present problems to force us into 
near-term solutions which compromise or make more difficult 
long-term planning for successful space ventures. There is a 
very definite place for the international insurance community 
in space exploration. However, space science and technology 
move rapidly, and the insurance industry must learn to adjust 
rapidly as well. Bold vision and leadership are needed, and 
some risks the industry would prefer not to take might have to 
be taken in order to capitalize on the intense future 
commercial uses of outer space which are sure to come. Perhaps 
David Lloyd George said it best: 11 Don 1 t be afraid to take a 
big step. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps. 11 
Let's keep in mind where we are in this point of recorded 
history. Only fifty years ago Charles Lindbergh ordered an 
airplane from the British firm Phillips and Powis, Ltd., to his 
own specifications. The plane was a Miles Mohawk reported by a 
magazine of the time to be "a well-equipped private machine for 
long-distance travel" and "powered by a Menasco Buccaneer, 
supercharged to 250 h.p., for fast high-level cruising." Also, 
only fifty years ago, Dr. Robert H. Goddard launched a 
four-chambered liquid propellant rocket to an altitude of 200 
feet at Roswell, New Mexico. I wo~der if these gentlemen and 
other pioneers like them ever considered the liability and 
insurance consequences of their work. Like it or not, there 
are profound social consequences which flow from technological 
advancement. 
At the dawn of the Space Age three decades ago, who could have 
foreseen that in 1987 some 125 nations would be involved in 
space-related activities? Who could have foreseen the 
development of independent space launch capabilities in Europe 
as well as in Japan, China, and India in addition to the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R.? The point is that the momentum toward more 
and mare space ventures is crystal clear. Just how the 
worldwide insurance industry can harness this momentum to its 
advantage is a major challenge. I salute their courage in 
undertaking the difficult task of finding solutions which are 
workable and satisfying. At the same time, I would caution 
them once again to avoid near-term solutions to current ills 
which might compromise the promise of the future. 
To provide an appropriate foundation for my discussion of 
options we at NASA have under consideration regarding our 
insurance and indemnification policies, as they relate to our 
customers and contractors, I would like to cover how NASA is 
planning to return the Space Shuttle fleet to safe flight as 
well as current U.S. policy regarding future uses of the 
Shuttle fleet. 
As we are all aware, prior to the Challenger accident the Space 
Shuttle had provided a versatile, cost-effective, and 
relatively risk-free access to outer space. The demonstrated 
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ability of the Shuttle and its crews to accomplish on-orbit 
repairs and to retrieve and return payloads to earth was truly 
outstanding and had obvious insurance implications. At the 
time of the accident, we were well into demonstrating 
construction techniques in space using the Shuttle as the test 
platform. The promise for the future utilizing skills that 
only humans can bring with them to space was clearly there. It 
still is as we prepare to return to manned space flight. 
We are engagsd in a massive effort to get flying again. The 
recommendations of the Presidential Commission which 
investigated the accident together with the NASA response have 
resulted in a far-ranging review of many aspects of the Shuttle 
program. The obvious immediate technical effort surrounds the 
redesign of the solid rocket motor joints and testing the 
redesign. Not so obvious, perhaps, is the parallel effort 
engaged in reviewing all critical items in the overall system, 
the main engines, and operational procedures. The design of 
the entire system is being reviewed as well as the mission 
rules and even personnel training. There is a pi-esent emphasis 
on safety considerations which is very intense and permeates 
all aspects of our planning for return to flight. 
On October 3, 1986, the NASA Administrator announced that we 
would launch again on February 18, 1988. There is nothing 
magic about this date, but it does represent our assessment of 
where our conserv~tive recovery program is taking us. Right 
now, of course, the pacing activity is the SRM redesign, test, 
manufacture, and qualification. If all goes as expected, 
February 18, 1988, may well be a good launch date. However, it 
should be very clear that safety of flight will dominate this 
and all launch decisions. This philosophy also has obvious 
insurance implications. 
While the technical replanning has been proceeding, we also 
have concurrently reexamined the·management struct~re of the 
Shuttle program. A new structure has been put in place which, 
we believe, will greatly strengthen the management control over 
the program. Whereas, previously the program had been largely 
managed at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, we now have a 
pro gram d i ~- e c to r i n Wash i n g ton w i th d i rec t au.tho r i t y over a 1 1 
aspects of the program. It will be a strong management 
structure not unlike the one we had in place during the Apollo 
program. Unfortunate as the Challenger accident was, the 
resulting long "down time" has provided us with the opportunity 
to perform an in-depth technical and management review of all 
aspects of the program. We have seized upon the opportunity, 
and we are firmly dedicated to returning the world's premier 
space vehicle to safe and reliable flight status in 1988. 
As we return to flight status, there will be a different look 
insofar as the future use of the Shuttle fleet in concerned. 
Our manifest includes evidence of a significant U.S. policy 
redirection. This redirection in the near term is the result 
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of a four-orbiter fleet suddenly and unexpectedly becoming a 
three-orbiter fleet and of a reduced flight rate for each 
available orbiter. But in the far term, the redirection 
evidences a reinvigorated poljcy initiative to draw the U.S. 
private sector into the commercial launch business. 
The change in direction was signalled by Pr~sident Reagan on 
August 15, 1986. On that date, he made the all-important 
announcement that the U.S. would build a replacement orbiter 
for the Challenger. But he also began a fundamental 
redirection regarding the use of the Shuttle fleet when he 
announced that NASA would no longer be in the business of 
launching private satellites and that the U.S. private sector 
would play an increasingly important role in the Americari space 
effort. Henceforth, NASA and the Shuttle fleet would be 
dedicated to payloads important to national security and 
foreign policy as well as exploration. pioneering, and 
developing new technologies and uses of space. 
With the overall policy direction established by the President 
last August, the focus of attention shifted to the Shuttle 
man i fest t o s r: e w h 1 ch pay 1 o ad r,::; lrJ c.11.1 1 ci be t- l own and when . There 
were many comple>( issues involved. Because of the Challengel-
acc i dent and other Pxpenciab 1 e 1 aunch veh i c 1 e fa i 1 ur-es. we have 
a large backloq of U.S. national security and scientific 
payloads which need early attention. Also, it is anticipated 
that the first Space Station launches will begin in 1993 and 
continue thereafter at a steady rate. In addition, because 
there will be a reduced flight rate for several years, space 
availab]e on the Shuttle betweerl 1988 and 1993 and beyond will 
be at a premium. 
The chore of setting priorities on the manifest was extremely 
difficult and involved a number of Government agencies. What 
emerged was a policy that the only commercial and foreiqn 
payloads that the Shuttle would carry in the future would be 
those that are Shuttle-unique or have national security or 
foreign policy implications. This, in turn, meant that the 
Shuttle manifest had to meld U.S. national security missions, 
U.S. scientific missions, Shuttle-unique payloads, and 
commercial and foreign payloads that had national security or 
foreign policy implications. The manifest which finally 
emerged represents an equitable balance of the competing 
interests within the new policy constraints. One consequence, 
of course, is that commercial and foreign payloads which are 
not Shuttle-unique nor have national security or foreign policy 
implications are ineligible for future Shuttle launches. Also, 
those payloads that were covered by launch services agreements 
with NASA but which are not on the manifest cannot be 
accommodated prior to the expiration at their agreements due to 
the reduced flight rate and the priorities established as a 
consequence of the Challenger accident. The expectation is 
that the ineligible and unaccommodated payloads will gravitate 
to U.S. private expendable launch vehicles, thereby furthering 
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another Presidential policy goal. Whether and to what extent 
this goal will be realized remains to be seen. 
When the Shuttle manifest was announced by the NASA 
Administrator on October 3, 1986, he pointed out that, through 
1994, 41 percent of the Shuttle capability will fill the needs 
of the Department of Defense; 47 percent will fill NASA's 
needs; and 12 percent will be allocated to commercial, foreign 
government, and other U.S. Government civil space needs. So 
then, this is our "new look" for the foreseeable future. What 
are the implications for the insurance industry? As a result 
of the policy changes, will NASA now lose interest in insurance 
matters? Not at all. We not only have those customers who are 
on the current manifest to be concerned about, but we will also 
continue to fly Shuttle-unique payloads and those having 
national security or foreign policy implications. In addition, 
we will always have our NASA contractors and subcontractors 
involved in Shuttle launch and mission operations. Our normal 
concerns and involvement with insurance and indemnification 
issues will continue without abatement. 
Let me share some of our current thinking on these matters. We 
continue to be very concerned about the continuity, capacity, 
and cost of sp~ce-related insurance. We are sympathetic toward 
the industry and its recent proble~s, and we appreciate the 
fact that risk management from the industry's viewpoint really 
turns out to be ·1argely unmanageable due to forces beyond its 
control. We are also confident that they know their business 
better than anyone else and are best equipped to manage their 
way out of their problems. However, we at NASA are in the 
space exploration business, and we can't afford to let 
insurance problems frustrate the accomplishment of our 
important missions. NASA has the means to solve most of its 
insurance problems, but in so doing we may further exacerbate 
the insurance industry's problems. 
I will try and explain what we are thinking by categories of 
activity. With regard to property damage or destruction, NASA 
has long had a policy whereby all Shuttle users, including the 
U.S. Government, must agi-ee to an interparty, no subrogation, 
cross-waiver as a condition of flight. Under this policy, each 
party agrees not to bring an action against any other party on 
the same flight for loss of or damage to property on the flight 
no matter whose fault it is. We intend to continue this policy 
on future Shuttle flights. This will continue to minimize the 
risk ,for Shuttle users but doesn't help a user decide whether 
to self-insure. NASA can't solve that problem, but hopefully 
the insurance industry can. We have gone as far as we can with 
our cross-waiver policy. 
On the other hand, insurance against liability to third parties 
presents an entirely different array of possible NASA options. 
Before listing them, let me state that NASA does not want to go 
into the insurance business. But, we will if we believe it is 
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necessary under the circumstances in order to further the 
exploration of outer space. Our current policy is to require 
our customers to carry up to $500 million worth of third party 
liability insurance, naming the U.S. Government as an insured 
party, over and above which the U.S. indemnifies the customer 
against liability. One of our options is to retain this 
policy; however, this may be somewhat unrealistic given the 
current state of capacity and premium cost. 
A realistic view of the current situation leads quickly to 
another option which is to reduce the scope of the risk to be 
insured. There are several aspects of this. The obvious 
reduction would be to reduce the $500 million requirement to 
somewhere between $100 and $300 million and hope the · 
accompanying premiums would be customer-palatable. Other 
associated reductions we have under consideration include the 
exclusion of the U.S. Government as a named insured while the 
payload is still in the Shuttle bay, as well as after 
deployment, and the elimination of the continuing insurance 
requirement for payloads in geostationary orbit. 
Another option would be to eliminate the insurance requirement 
altogether. However, this probably would not be very 
practical. Not many enterprises would be willing to "bet the 
company" although large institutions might be willing to absorb 
the risk in lieu of insurance. An offshoot of this might 
involve some combination of customer self-insurance and NASA 
indemnification. In other words, the customer would agree to 
self-insure up to an agreed level of coverage and NASA would 
indemnify the customer against third party liability above that 
level. In such a case, NASA would require that customer assets 
be encumbered in some way for some period of time against the 
possibility of a liability payout. 
Other options would put NASA in the insurance business. Under 
section 308 of the Space Act, NASA has the authority to provide 
liability insurance for Shuttle users and charge a premium. We 
have never done this and don't desire to, but we can. There 
are at least four interesting possibilities here. The first 
would be to allow a user to purchase a first layer of coverage 
from NASA, purchase a second layer commercially, and then NASA 
would indemnify the user above the second layer at no charge. 
This would be an "insurance sandwich." An alternate "sandwich" 
would be to reverse the first two layers; i.e., the user would 
purchase the first layer commercially, the second layer from 
NASA, and NASA would again indemnify over and above the second 
layer at no charge. 
The third possibility might be a sharing arrangement whereby 
the user and NASA share each dollar of liability in the first 
layer, or perhaps any layer, and NASA would charge the user a 
premium based on the sharing arrangement. Finally, NASA could 
indemnify a user against all third party liability and charge 
the user an appropriate fee. The point here is that NASA has 
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options available to ease insurance-related impediments to 
access to space. We don't want to compete with the insurance 
industry nor deprive it or a business base, but we might have 
to should access to space become jeopardized due to an 
insurance crisis. 
That brings me to the last topic for this paper--NASA 
contractors and subcontractors involved in Shuttle operations. 
The problem here is relatively simple and straightforward. It 
involves the pass-through of premiums charged our contractors 
for third party liability insurance to the U.S. Government. 
Under our contracts, these· costs are reimbursable by NASA to 
our contractors. In other words, NASA has been paying large 
sums to the insurance industry for coverage related to Shuttle 
operations. This was not a problem for NASA until large premium 
increases began arriving without explanation and without any 
apparent connection to liability or increased risk. It became 
intolerable, and we concluded that we could better use our 
limited financial resources for program purposes. In 1984 we 
began to indemnify some our contractors totally or partially 
against third party liability which might arise during.Shuttle 
operations. 
For example, we indemnify Rockwell and Lockheed from the first 
dollar and others above specified amounts. We are now getting 
more and more pressure to extend indemnification to other 
contractors and subcontractors since the Challenger accident. 
The point is that NASA is saving millions of dollars in premium 
expenses we would otherwise be paying through our contractors 
to the insurance industry. That's good news for NASA; however, 
this removes hundreds of millions of dollars from the premium 
base of the insurance industry. 
We would be happy to reexamine the way this is going if the 
industry would come up with some plan for getting Shuttle 
operations insurance under some reasonable control. There has 
been talk for years about establishing contractor pools to 
share the risk on a broad basis with some combination of 
insurance and NASA indemnification; but nothing ever 
materializes. We would be pleased to work with the insurance 
and contractor communities if appropriate representatives or 
groups of representatives could be identified to us. We have 
some time to work on this before the next Shuttle launch but 
time is rapidly running ou·t. NASA can't pull this together on 
its own; we are not equipped to do so. We will help to the 
extent that we can, but if things don't start to get better we 
will resort to one of the most basic, time-honored principles 
of human behavior--self help. And don't forget--the Space 
Station is coming! 
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